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ABSTRACT
Today’s geo-location estimation approaches are able to infer
the location of a target image using its visual content alone.
These approaches exploit visual matching techniques, ap-
plied to a large collection of background images with known
geo-locations. Users who are unaware that visual retrieval
approaches can compromise their geo-privacy, unwittingly
open themselves to risks of crime or other unintended con-
sequences. Private photo sharing is not able to protect users
effectively, since its inconvenience is a barrier to consistent
use, and photos can still fall into the wrong hands if they
are re-shared. This paper lays the groundwork for a new ap-
proach to geo-privacy of social images: Instead of requiring
a complete change of user behavior, we investigate the pro-
tection potential latent in users existing practices. We carry
out a series of retrieval experiments using a large collec-
tion of social images (8.5M) to systematically analyze where
users should be wary, and how both photo taking and editing
practices impact the performance of geo-location estimation.
We find that practices that are currently widespread are al-
ready sufficient to protect single-handedly the geo-location
(‘geo-cloak’) up to more than 50% of images whose location
would otherwise be automatically predictable. Our conclu-
sion is that protecting users against the unwanted effects of
visual retrieval is a viable research field, and should take as
its starting point existing user practices.
1. INTRODUCTION
As image technologies improve, it is possible in an in-
creasing number of cases to automatically infer the location
at which a photo was taken on the basis of its visual content.
Most work on Geo-location Estimation (GLE), emphasizes
the usefulness of geo-coordinates in organizing photo col-
lections, and improving multimedia retrieval e.g., [18, 32,
34, 35]. However, the success of GLE in supporting users
in browsing and finding photos, depends critically on our
Figure 1: Geo-location Estimation can automati-
cally infer the location of a target photo, shared
online by a user (first column), if at least one visu-
ally matching ‘geo-propagator’ image exists in the
background collection (middle column). However,
widespread practices, such as framing (last column,
top two rows) or enhancement (rightmost column,
bottom two rows) can serve to protect image loca-
tion information.
ability as a multimedia research community, to understand
and mitigate its risks. Users unknowingly release informa-
tion about their location when they share photos, surrender
control of their own geo-privacy, and make themselves vul-
nerable. The purpose of this paper is to lay the foundation
for a new line of research directed at supporting users in
protecting themselves, given their own natural phototaking
and sharing behavior.
The key points about GLE for social images that are rele-
vant for this paper are illustrated by the examples in Fig. 1.
The first image of each row is a photo that has been uploaded
by a user to a popular photosharing platform (Flickr), and
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whose geo-location is correctly predicted by our GLE ap-
proach. Our approach, which uses geometric visual match-
ing, represents the state of the art in GLE, and is described
in detail later. At this point, we introduce its core mech-
anism, which is typical for GLE technology for social im-
ages. The approach makes use of a large background collec-
tion containing photos for which the geo-location is already
known, for example, because the photos are accompanied by
GPS coordinates or manually geo-tagged by the uploading
user. Here, we use 8.5 million images. The target image is
used to retrieve ‘geo-propagators’, visually matching images
from the background collection. In Fig. 1, the first image of
each row is a target image, i.e., a photo that has been shared
by a user. Geo-location prediction is accomplished by prop-
agating the geo-coordinates of one or more geo-propagators
to the target image.
In Fig. 1, the middle image of each row is the image that
was found by our GLE system and used as a ‘geo-propagator’
to infer the location of the target image. This image was
taken by a different user, who either used a camera that
recorded GPS coordinates, or provided the geo-location dur-
ing upload. Note that GLE does not build a explicit model
of a location, rather, a single photo uploaded by another user
is sufficient to identify the geo-location at which the target
photo was taken. In the top two rows, the target photo and
the geo-propagator depict the same object/landmark. How-
ever, the visual match can also involve what could otherwise
be considered unimportant background detail, as in c and
d.
It is natural for the first two columns of Fig. 1 to be a
cause for some alarm. These are photographs uploaded by
users, who most likely assume that the location of the photo
would be protected if they turned off the GPS of their cam-
eras. The unintended consequences range from annoying
(e.g., for newly weds who were not planning to reveal their
secret honeymoon destination) to downright dangerous (e.g.,
for a young mother targeted by a stalker). This alarm is the
factor that triggered this paper. However, the basic insight
that we build on is fundamentally a positive one: Users’
photo taking and sharing behavior does not always lead to
geo-privacy risks. If we can analyze natural behavior that
protects privacy, then we take a step towards achieving our
ultimate, long term goal, of developing multimedia technol-
ogy that puts control over geo-privacy back into the hands
of users.
The third column of Fig. 1 illustrates widespread practices
that are naturally protective of geo-privacy. These images
are comparable to those in the first column from the user
perspective. However, in contrast to the first-column im-
ages, their locations can not be predicted by our GLE algo-
rithm. In the top two rows, we see that a user has changed
the framing, i.e., the way in which the photo was taken. In
moving away from the ‘typical’ shot, the user is attempt-
ing to create a unique effect, and at the same time (and
we assume without explicit intention) creates a geo-privacy
protected photo. In the other two images Instagram filters
have been applied: Lomo (people at conference) and Toaster
(father with kid). After application of these filters, the lo-
cations of the images can no longer be correctly predicted
by our GLE algorithm.
In short, these examples point towards the existence of
simple practices applied by users that naturally geo-cloak
their images, i.e., prevent the locations of those images from
being automatically predicted. The implication is that it is
not necessary to introduce new, never-before-seen technolo-
gies in order to protect users’ geo-privacy. Such technologies
require user acceptance and widespread uptake before they
can be effective. Rather, we can target new information re-
trieval technologies that build on behaviors that users nat-
urally engage in, independently of privacy considerations.
This paper represents a first step on the road to such tech-
nologies.
We take the position that GLE technology has both pos-
itive and negative implications for users. For this reason,
we necessarily approach the topic of geo-privacy for social
images, not with the goal of developing the ultimate pri-
vacy protecting algorithm, but rather, with the goal of at-
taining the correct balance between positive and unintended
consequences. It is important to note that we are not as-
serting that every image must be geo-privacy protected/geo-
cloaked. Indeed, there are many images taken and shared
by users precisely for the reason of revealing geo-location,
apparently to as many other people as possible. We do not
propose that every picture of the Eiffel Tower or of the Taj
Mahal should be visually distinctive. Rather, we strive to
understand how users’ behavior impacts geo-privacy because
of its importance in situations where geo-location informa-
tion is ‘incidental’ to images, and represents a potential,
unintended geo-privacy leak. Because of the rate at which
photos are taken and shared by users online the balance
that we strive to achieve is necessarily a dynamic balance.
A photo whose geo-location cannot be identified by our sys-
tem today, might well be identifiable tomorrow, as more
images are taken and added to the background collection.
We address the dynamic balance by considering not only
the geo-cloaking of individual images, but also the connec-
tion of how the ability of a given photo to compromise the
geo-privacy of the user is related to the availability of other
photos online.
The paper makes the following contributions:
• User photo taking behavior: Experiments showing that
where, how, and when users take photos impacts au-
tomatic GLE,
• Image editing behavior: Experiments showing the way
in which widespread image enhancements (e.g., filters
and cropping) impact automatic GLE,
• Research challenges: Jump-start a new line of research
devoted to visual geo-privacy that protects against un-
wanted affects of visual retrieval by leveraging natural
user behavior.
In the next section, we provide additional motivation for
the paper and also cover related work. Then we present
the results of our experiment-based analysis. We distill the
results into a series of recommendations for user behaviors
that promote geo-privacy protection.
2. MOTIVATION AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we provide additional background and mo-
tivation for our work, and discuss its relationship to existing
work.
2.1 The importance of geo-privacy
Privacy involves the ability to control information about
oneself, and, by extension, we define geo-privacy as the abil-
ity to control information about one’s location, both in the
past and in the future. As mentioned in the introduction,
leaks of personal geo-information can be annoying. The lit-
erature, however, tends to cover the more dangerous con-
sequences, especially the phenomena of ‘cybercasing’, bur-
glars automatically harvesting information about potential
victims online [11]. The phenomenon of stalking has been
connected to opportunity [30], and, as such, geo-information
in the hands of the perpetrator renders the victim more vul-
nerable.
In the real world, there are no failsafe protections against
burglars and stalkers. Instead, people protect themselves by
trading off convenience with conventional protection mea-
sures. Our goal in seeking to protect geo-privacy is to in-
crease the number of measures at users’ disposal to protect
themselves.
There are obvious parallels between concerns about auto-
matic face detection algorithms compromising privacy [33],
and geo-location estimation algorithms compromising pri-
vacy. However, geo-location estimation is potentially more
pernicious, since users are likely unaware of conditions under
which a GLE algorithm can automatically predict the loca-
tions of their images. The first ‘GLE condition’ is the visual
distinctiveness of the image content. The visual elements
that allow GLE to geo-locate the images in the first column
of Fig. 1 range from fairly obvious to barely noticeable. The
second ‘GLE condition’ is the presence of ‘geo-propagators’
in the background collection that are visually closer to the
target image than images taken at other locations. Although
a user may have a rough idea of the number of photographs
taken at a given location, there is no way to guess the exis-
tence of visually similar locations. The impossibility of de-
ciding whether the GLE conditions are satisfied, mean that
users are, an can be expected to remain, easily susceptible to
inadvertently leaking geo-information when sharing photos.
Two points characterize the nature of the negative im-
pact that automatic GLE of social images poses to user geo-
privacy. First, GLE is dangerous not because it is able to
identify the location at which an image is taken, but rather
because it is able to do so automatically. Automatic process-
ing is fast, and makes it possible to mine large collections
of social images in search of vulnerabilities, as with cyber-
casing, mentioned above. Second, automatic processing can
potentially identify location in cases which would be chal-
lenging for a human observer. The number of people who
can identify the locations of the images in Fig. 1 is relatively
small. They can, however, be identified by anyone with ac-
cess to GLE technology. The goal in protecting geo-privacy
is not to completely eradicate evidence of location in social
images, but rather to slow down or hold back the ability
of GLE algorithms to automatically process large quanti-
ties of social images and extract location information. Users
should retain control over whether or not their images are
geo-locatable or not.
2.2 Social images and geo-location estimation
This paper takes the position that it is important to un-
derstand how user behavior impacts automatic geo-location
estimation technology, since this technology opens users to
risks that they may be unaware of. It should be noted that
this is a nuanced stance—we do not claim that all automatic
geo-location estimation is bad, rather that we need to under-
stand the extent to which users can control whether or not it
can be applied to their photos. In this subsection, we briefly
review the work on geo-location estimation. This work has
generally emphasized the positive side of image GLE, and
the potential it has to serve users in browsing and finding
images.
2.2.1 Text-based image Geo-location Estimation
An important body of work on automatic geo-location es-
timation for social images exploits textual information in the
form of tags and descriptions that are contributed by users,
usually the uploaders themselves. Early work included [32],
and ultimately the most effective approach was one that
built language models of tags, such as [35]. Anticipating the
results of the experimental section, visual-based GLE does
not achieve the same level of performance that has been re-
ported for the state-of-the-art text-based GLE system using
the same dataset [29]. We consider text as less of a threat to
users’ geo-privacy, since it is relatively easy to disassociate
text from an image. Although this paper is devoted to pro-
tecting users against the unintended consequences of visual
GLE, we point out that ultimately researchers need to ad-
dress the unintended consequences of hybrid textual/visual
GLE.
2.2.2 Visual-based Geo-location estimation
Visual-approaches to automatic geo-location estimation
can be divided into two approaches. The first set attempts
to predict the geo-location given a relatively restricted range
of candidate locations. The second set, to which the work
in this paper belongs, attempts to predict the geo-location
of photos any where on the surface of the world. For this
purpose, retrieval techniques applied to a large background
collection of geo-tagged images are exploited, as mentioned
in the introduction.
The first set of Geo-constrained location prediction ap-
proaches has included city-scale landmark recognition [6],
estimation of location in target images using geo-informative
visual attributes learned from training images of cities [22] [10],
or as a classification [12].
Compared to the effort that has been devoted to geo-
constrained location prediction, there has been relatively less
work dedicated to predicting locations at the global scale.
A major contribution in this direction was the approach by
Hays and Efros [18]. They deployed various global visual
representations to model the visual scene similarity between
images and employed the Mean Shift Clustering approach to
estimate the location. Further contributions can be found
among the submissions to the Placing Task of the MediaE-
val multimedia evaluation benchmark, which addressed the
challenge of location prediction of social images [17]. One
of the state of the art system is the Geo-Visual Ranking
approach proposed by Li et al. [24]. Given a query image,
a geo-location is recommended based on the evidence col-
lected from images that are not only geographically close to
this geo-location, but also have sufficient visual similarity
to the query image within the considered image collection.
This makes it to improve over two major classes of previous
approaches, addressing the disadvantages of both 1-NN and
clustering [18].
2.3 Weakness of other geo-privacy approaches
Next we cover possible alternative approaches that could
be taken to geo-privacy. We mention them here in order to
highlight their weaknesses, and underline the importance of
gaining insight into how users natural behavior can already
serve to protect their privacy.
2.3.1 Keypoint Removal and Re-injection
The forensics and image analysis communities have de-
voted quite a bit of effort to techniques that conceal im-
ages from SIFT-based image retrieval system by removing
keypoints and forging in new keypoints [8, 9, 19]. These
systems were studied in the context of copyright detection
and explore the robustness of near duplicate detection sys-
tems. This work differs from our own in that social images
uploaded by users are very diverse, and for this reason, the
need to handle near-duplicates is not common in GLE.
There are two drawbacks to this technology for protecting
user geo-privacy. First, SIFT removal and injection attack
may add distortion and artifacts to the image. In contrast
to our approach, such technology cannot take for granted
that the aesthetics of the image will be preserved. Second,
such technology requires users to add a separate step to their
photo-taking and image enhancement practices. A certain
number of users would likely adopt the technologies, but
large-scale adoption would demand an unprecedented level
of acceptance.
2.3.2 Human-based solutions
So-called ‘human-based solutions’ would require users to
change their behavior in response to awareness of the risks of
online photo sharing. Social networking and photo-sharing
websites are increasingly offering the opportunities of shar-
ing photos privately. Researchers studying user behavior
with respect to photo privacy have found that users experi-
ence a strong desire to participate in social sharing, which
exerts a force on them to accept problems resulting from
lack of control over their identity and disclosures [4]. The
difficulty that users experience in dealing with complicated
privacy settings is uncovered by [23] As a result of these dif-
ficulties, users make the choice of easy (i.e., public) sharing
over privacy protective measures when they get overloaded.
People are worried that the photo will not be shared prop-
erly and this impact their decision to share privately [1].
Computer scientists have developed many mechanisms to
protect users’ privacy, such as encrypted email and messag-
ing. However, users are slow to adopt such solutions for a
range of reasons. We reject solutions that require users to
radically change their behavior for the simple practical rea-
son that any approach to geo-privacy that is not actively
used by users is effectively worthless.
2.3.3 Strength of simplicity
Recently, appreciation has arisen for simple, practical,
filter-based approaches in service of privacy protection. The
movement, typified by [5], has been led by researchers inves-
tigating how private information in images can be protected
from human viewers. In contrast, in this work we investigate
approaches to protect image content from algorithms. How-
ever, like these researchers we recognize the value of simple
approaches that are easy to apply in practice. Additionally,
we point out the recent work that has been carried out on de-
ceiving image classifiers that use deep neural networks [28].
In the context of privacy preservation, deceiving a classifier
means protecting the content of an image. Here, instead of
classification we focus on retrieval approaches that are used
to infer image content. Such approaches may ultimately
prove more difficult to defeat, since they require minimally
one correct match, rather than a set of classifier training
data.
3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we set the stage for our analysis of the
interaction of automatic GLE technology with user behavior
by describing the setup of our experiments.
3.1 Data set and evaluation
In order to ensure the validity and impact our experimen-
tal results, we need a data set that is representative in scale
for the state of the art in social image geo-location, and that
is also publicly available, making it possible for researchers
who follow us to reproduce the experimental findings of this
paper. We choose the MediaEval Placing Task 2013 Data
Set [16]1, a Creative Commons licensed set of images gath-
ered from Flickr, which fulfills both of these criteria. Our
experiments consist of two parts, GLE matching, and result
analysis, and call for the application of both commercial
tools and manual analysis. In order to ensure that we do
not surpass the bonds of the resources at our disposal, we
concentrate our experiments on a set of target images (also
called, ‘query images’) that were taken in a specific region,
San Francisco, California. We choose our region to be highly
dense, since it this way it can be considered representative of
the state which many regions of the world can be expected
to reach, as the number of images taken by users continues
to grow in future years. Table 1, reports the basic statistics
on the composition of our data set.
Background
Collection
Target Images
Toponym-Tagged
Target Images
Toponym-Tagless
Target Images
8,539,050 2,006 1,264 742
Table 1: The total number of background collec-
tion images used in our experiments, together with
statistics on our target images, which are from the
San Francisco Area.
One aspect that we are invested in investigation in our
experiments is the ‘photographic intent’ of the user taking
and sharing the image. As mentioned, in the introduction,
we do not advocate ‘geo-cloaking’ every social image, but
rather giving the user control over geo-information that is
shared along with social images. We are interested in mak-
ing a separation between cases in which the user probably
intended to reveal the location of the image, and cases in
which the revelation of the location is more likely to be un-
tended. This separation allows us to study the different
impacts of image GLE and geo-cloaking for these two types
of situation. We made the differentiation between images
where the user probably did and possibly did not mean to
reveal geo-information by analyzing the tags assigned by the
uploader to the images. We put images that contain at least
one place-related tag (i.e., toponym) into a set we refer to as
toponym tagged images and all other images are assigned to
the set toponym tagless images. To identify toponyms, we
use an analysis of tag geo-distribution, described in [7], to
check how representative each tag is for location. Toponym
detection is based on a concept to similar to the TF-IDF
1http://www.st.ewi.tudelft.nl/~hauff/
placingTask2013Data.html
weighting scheme for words in a document collection. A tag
is considered as a toponym when it appears frequently only
around certain region, and is not considered a toponym if it
appears in many different regions. As reported in Table 1,
63% of the target images had at least one toponym among
their tags.
The results of our experiments are reported in terms of
two different kinds of evaluation. First, the evaluation per-
formance of the image GLE system. This is measured in
terms of the percentage of photos whose geo-locations were
correctly estimated with a given distance threshold (i.e., ra-
dius) of their ground truth location. The ground truth of the
photos is the position at which the photographer was stand-
ing when the picture was taken. We use the geo-coordinates
recorded by the GPS of the user’s camera, or assigned by
hand to the user during the process of uploading to Flickr.
We focus on two distance thresholds: 100 meters and 1 kilo-
meter. We choose 100 meters since this small distance is
most ‘dangerous’ for malicious uses of image geo-locations,
such as cybercasing, because it makes it possible to pick out
the addresses of individual residences [11]. We choose 1km
because this distance is also small enough to be quite wor-
risome for privacy considerations, but large enough to take
into account the way in which uploaders add geo-coordinates
to their photos. Some uploaders assign their photos the geo-
location of the main object in the photo, rather that the
photograph location. The 1km distance allows us to take
into account the fact that for some photos this distance is
relatively far.
Second, we report the performance the results of our ex-
periments in terms of percent cloaked. This is the proportion
of the number of images that can be correctly geo-located
with the original image, that can no longer be correctly geo-
located once a specific ‘enhancement’, e.g., a filter, has been
applied. Note that in most GLE papers, the authors are
attempted to increase the percent correct of images whose
location is correctly predicted. In this work, we are inter-
ested in user behaviors that decrease the percent correct,
and rather increase the percent cloaked.
3.2 Visual geo-location estimation approach
Next we describe the GLE systems that were used for the
experiments. Both systems use a top-one nearest neighbor
approach to GLE. This means that the target photo is used
as a query, and the system returns a list of results from the
background collection that are ranked with respect to visual
similarity to the query. The top-ranked image is taken as the
‘geo-propagator’ and its coordinates are used to predict the
location of the target image. The systems differ with respect
to the way in which they compute visual similarities. Below,
we describe each in turn.
3.2.1 Baseline: Basic Nearest Neighbor (BNN)
As a baseline for image GLE we choose a very basic system
that implements the standard bag-of-visual-words paradigm
for image retrieval in a large scale dataset [13]. A codebook
of 1000 visual words was generated using SIFT descriptors
from randomly sampled subset of the background collection.
Randomized KD-trees were trained with the background col-
lection images and vlfeat2 was used for extracting SIFT fea-
ture [26]. FLANN(Fast Library for Approximate Nearest
2http://www.vlfeat.org/
Neighbor) 3 was used for nearest-neighbor matching. Im-
ages in the database that could not be handled by vlfeat
was excluded and 7,563,041 images were used for generating
index for the baseline system.
3.2.2 Advanced: Pairwise Geometric Matching (PGM)
Our main system for image GLE represents the state-of-
the-art in GLE for social images. For visual matching, it
exploits a pairwise geometric matching technique, recently
introduced in [25]. Like the BNN system, it built upon the
standard bag-of-visual-words paradigm, which scales up well
to a large-scale datasets [2].
To speed up retrieval and also improve accuracy, we also
adopt the technique which was proposed [21], which repre-
sents subregions of the feature space by signatures, and com-
pares descriptors based, not only on visual words, but also
on the distance between their subregions within the feature
space. When calculating the initial ranking score, we employ
the burst weighting scheme developed in [20]. In order to
deal with quantization noise introduced by visual word as-
signment, we take advantage of the strategy used in [20, 21].
The strategy assigns a given descriptor to several nearest
visual words. Since multiple assignment strategy causes a
significant increase in the number of visual words per image,
e.g., on average 4.2 visual words per descriptor, we apply it
only to the query image, and not to the images in the back-
ground collection.
To find the reliable correspondences, the initial list is re-
ranked using a geometric matching techniques. Our tech-
nique, pairwise geometric matching, improves over existing
techniques because it not only requirements matches be-
tween key points, it also requires matches between pairs of
matching key points. The details of the algorithm, and a
series of experiments which demonstrate its superiority to
existing approaches, are described in [25]. We deploy the
BoofCV software to extract SURF descriptors with default
parameters and use exact k-means to cluster these descrip-
tors and generate visual words. To mimic the situation in
a real retrieval system, we use a separate set of 50k ran-
domly selected images from Flickr to train the generic 20k
vocabulary set and use it in all experiments.
4. IMPACTOFPHOTO-TAKINGBEHAVIOR
We now turn to our experiments and analysis. In this
section, we investigate how the behavior of the photographer
impacts the ability of image GLE to predict correct geo-
locations for photos. We are specifically interested in how
the photographers choices of framing and location impact
whether the photo can be correctly geo-located. We also
examine
4.1 Geo-locatable social images
First, we discuss the overall performance of our image
GLE systems. Table 2 shows the performance of two visual
geo-location estimation system. BNN-SIFT represents the
baseline nearest neighbor approach using SIFT descriptors
and PGM-SURF represents the pairwise geometric matching
approach using SURF descriptors. Each number represents
the percentage of query images those geo-locations are esti-
mated within the distance thresholds from the groundtruth.
We see that, as expected, the advanced PGM-SURF system
3http://www.cs.ubc.ca/research/flann/
outperforms the baseline BNN-SIFT system, and is able to
correctly estimate the location of nearly 12% of the photos
in the test collection.
Overall Toponym-Tagged Toponym-Tagless
100m 1km 100m 1km 100m 1km
BNN-SIFT 3.04 8.13 3.32 9.33 2.56 6.06
PGM-SURF 7.63 11.86 9.49 12.10 4.45 11.46
Table 2: Geo-location estimation performance of
two systems: Each number represents the percent-
age of query photos that are correctly estimated
within the distance thresholds 100m and 1km from
the groundtruth.
Note that although this is the first time that PGM results
have been reported for a problem at this scale, the focus
here is not on the image GLE algorithm itself, but rather on
widespread user photo-taking and enhancement practices.
For this reason, it is important that the PGM algorithm
is state of the art, but we are not looking to improve it,
but rather we are investigating the factors that negatively
impact its performance. When compared to the ultimate
target of image GLE, to correctly geo-locate 100% of social
images, our advanced system, which can only geo-locate 12%
of images seems rather unthreatening. Unfortunately, this
feeling is a false sense of security. Recall from above, that
geo-privacy is compromised by large scale mining of images
that searches for vulnerable victims to target. For people
who leak visual geo-information by mistake, the potential of
12% to translates into direct damage is something that the
community needs to take seriously, given that in 7.63% of
the cases, the information is exact to the 100 meters level.
Further, the comparison with the baseline shows that the
technology is rapidly improving, suggesting that the coming
years will see further improvements. The current state of
GLE technology is a strong motivator to start, as is our
goal in this paper, on the large mission of understanding
how control over visual geo-information can be put in the
hands of this paper.
4.2 Photographer geo-intent
As mentioned in the introduction, our focus is on ex-
amining the geo-privacy aspects of images for which the
user may not be aware that GLE can automatically pre-
dict their location. As described in Section 3.1, we divide
the target image set into “toponym-tagged” and “toponym-
tagless” subsets since we are interested is studying cases sep-
arately in which the photographer probably was and may
not have been aware that their photos were communicat-
ing geo-information. The results in Table 2 demonstrate
that it is easier for estimate the geo-location of ”toponym-
tagged” images rather than ”toponym-tagless” images. This
result suggests that when the photographer has a true ‘geo-
intent’, i.e., intends to reveal the location of the photo, that
location is also better reflected in the visual content of the
photo, than it is in cases in which the photographer does
not necessary want to communicate location along with the
photo.
There is apparently a connection between not necessarily
wanting the location of a photo to be known, and not in-
cluding visually geo-specific content in the photo that would
make the photo findable. This result provides a first indica-
tion that we are on the right track with our idea that certain
user behaviors ‘naturally’ protect images. Understanding
these users behavior, will, ultimately make it possible to
reinforce them, reducing the incidences of geo-information
leaks compromising user privacy.
4.3 Location and collective photo patterns
Next, we turn to consideration of how the collective photo-
taking behavior of users impacts automatic image GLE.
Recall that the ‘GLE conditions’ involve an image match-
ing other images taken at its location more closely than it
matches images taken at different locations. For this reason,
we go beyond considering whether individual images can be
geo-located, to also studying the geo-location properties of
the collection as a whole. Our first step is to visualize our
area of interest in terms of locations at which users’ geo-
privacy is particularly vulnerable to compromise (Fig. 2).
Figure 2: Where to be wary: Heat map showing
the distribution of the photos in our test set of tar-
get images whose geo-locations can automatically be
correctly predicted.
These patterns result from the fact that certain places are
more frequented by people, because they are interesting in
and of themselves, or that events that are interesting take
place here. We are unsurprised to note that photographs at
touristic destinations such as the Golden Gate bridge and
Alcatraz. However, the map makes in Fig. 2 makes clear
that image GLE technology goes beyond touristic landmarks
in its ability to predict the geo-locations of photos. As such,
it is not reasonable to assume that a users can develop in-
tuitions for where they are in a ‘safe’ place to take a photo
without compromising their geo-privacy. Looking towards
the future, we note that these patterns of geo-distribution
can be expected to change as collections like Google street
view become more readily available, for example, the data
set used by ICMLA Streetview Recognition Challenge [14].
4.4 Photographer framing
Now, we turn to investigate the question of whether there
are certain, common behaviors of photographers that con-
tribute to images being naturally protected from automatic
GLE. Here, we carried out a qualitative investigation of a
selection of the ‘hot spots’ in San Francisco, shown in Fig. 2,
comparing the images that were correctly geo-located with
Figure 3: Zoomed (or scaled) image may have wrong
GLE despite the existence of images with a wider
view in the background collection.
those that were not. We are interested in photographic
framing, which includes the way in which the photographer
composes the image, but also includes other decisions about
how the image is taken, including lighting [31]. Our in-
vestigation, which was carried out by manual analysis, re-
vealed a set of interesting factors with a geo-cloaking effect
on images. Specifically, we discovered three photographer
behaviors that made the difference between a photo being
geo-located or geo-cloaked: use of unexpected angles, use
of unconventional scales, taking photos at different times of
the day.
Fig. 1 illustrates cases in which the angle (top row) and
the time of day (middle row) differentiate a photo that can
be automatically geo-located. In Fig. 3, we show the case
of zoomed in photos being protected. Note that these ef-
fects cannot be attributed to the underlying visual features,
which are rotation, lighting, and scale invariant. Rather,
they are due to the fact that diverse framing means that
photos have less visual overlap with each other, and for this
reason are less likely to have a ‘geo-propagator’ in the back-
ground collection that can be used to correctly predict their
geo-location. The evidence points to the conclusion that the
drive of photographers to use different types of framing to
make their photos interesting and attractive naturally pro-
tects their photos from automatic GLE. As more and more
photos are put online, a specific framing of a scene may be
picked up and used by multiple photographers. However,
if the choice of framing is made by photographers because
they are attempting to create unique images, then we can
anticipate a trend towards natural diversification, and the
continued contribution of framing effects to balancing geo-
location with geo-cloaking.
5. IMPACT OF IMAGE ENHANCEMENT
In this section, we move beyond the act of photo-taking
to also examine practices of image enhancement that are
in widespread use among users who share photos online.
We investigate how enhancement affects automatic GLE of
individual photos, and also how enhancement practices scale
up as they are used not just by individual users, but by many
users contributing images to the background collection.
5.1 Users behavior and image enhancement
We define image enhancement as filters and other edits
that people apply during or after image capture in order
to heighten the attractiveness of the image. Specifically,
we are interested in enhancements that are highly popular,
since these best reflect the widespread natural user behavior,
which is the focus of our study. We focus on filters and
features that are available to users on Instagram4, one of the
most widely used photo sharing/social networking services.
Perhaps the simplest thing that users do to make their
images more attractive is cropping. Cropping is often used
to cut out clutters in the image and helps the viewer to con-
centrate on the main subject. Images evidently lose some
of its contents along the edge lines when cropped. We are
interested in cropping because of its potential to cut out inci-
dental matches in background that could allow photos to be
geo-located. Next, we are interested in tilt-shift. Tilt-shift
photography manipulates focus and depth-of-field to yield
photos that have selective focus, often mimicking a minia-
ture model. Instagram provides a post-production fake tilt-
shift feature. Unlike cropping, tilt-shifted image still retains
all of the original pixels, although the areas outside the fo-
cus point becomes blurred. We are interested in tilt-shift
because it is popular, and also because the blur potentially
eliminates matches in background.
We focus a large number of experiments on filters. A filter
is a preset recipe for adjusting various photographic settings
(exposure, contrast, color balance, etc) of a photo to give
it certain look and feel. Instagram offers a large number
of filters that are carefully tailored, and provide users with
a convenient means of enhancing the attractiveness of the
photo, with no need for special skill. We are interested in
Instagram filters, since their popularity strongly suggests
that users feel that they add value to images. Effectively,
these filters represent a common practice already applied by
users that potentially results in a loss of visual information
in images, that can provide a geo-cloaking effect.
Instagram currently provides 27 filters for use. Accord-
ing to the survey released by TrackMaven [15], normal or
#nofilter is by far the most popular filter with 26% of the
total photos. Among the popular filters are Kelvin, Lomo,
Nashville, and Toaster, which we selected for our study be-
cause they have a relatively strong influence on the original
image, and thereby promising geo-cloaking effects. Although
the Gotham filter has been discontinued by Instagram, we
chose to also include it in our study, since effects are very
dramatic with lots of contrast added. The following gives
an overview of the filters. Figure 4 shows an example with
each filters’ effect.
• Gotham filter produces a black&white, high contrast
image with bluish undertones.
• Kelvin filter applies a strong peach/orange overlay.
• Lomo filter boosts contrast, and applies vignette (i.e.,
reduction in brightness/saturation around the edges).
• Nashville filter gives a washed out 80s fashion photo
feel with warmed up temperature, lowered contrast
and increased exposure.
• Toaster filter features vivid colors with pink/orange
glow out of the center.
To carry out the experiments we applied the enhance-
ments to the target photos, and, for the final experiment,
also to images in the background collection. Instagram fil-
ters were applied using ImageMagick5 in a Python wrapper.
Cropping was done using Smart Cropping service provided
by Imagga6. The Imagga cropping API analyzes images in
4https://instagram.com/
5http://www.imagemagick.org
6https://imagga.com/technology/
smart-cropping-and-slicing.html
Figure 4: Image enhancements (popular on Insta-
gram) use in our experiment. Center is the original
image. Clockwise from top left: Gotham, Kelvin,
Lomo, Toaster, Tiltshift, Crop40%, Crop20% and
Nashville.
terms of composition, color and object localization, and at-
tempts to crop in a way that the main subject material of
interest remains in the photo. Cropping was applied to crop
out 20% and 40% of the original image, respectively. The
aspect ratio of the photo was preserved. Tilt-shift effect was
applied with a simple Python script [27]. We took the center
point of a cropped image generated by Smart Cropping as
the focus point of the original image, and the y-axis value
of the center point was used to apply linear tilt-shift.
5.2 Geo-cloaking effects of image enhancement
Our experiments revealed that our enhancement filters
demonstrated a clear ability to protect the location of images
from being automatically predicted by GLE. An overview of
the geo-cloaking performance of the filters is provided in
Table 3.
Filter Crop Tilt
shiftGOT KEL LOM NAS TOA 20% 40%
SIFT-BNN 64.1 12.8 44.9 15.4 75.8 -1.2 5.8 21.5
SURF-PGM 51.0 -2.6 29.4 5.9 53.6 -3.3 4.6 15.7
Table 3: Net geo-cloaking percentage: Ratio be-
tween the number of images that can be automat-
ically geo-located after and before an enhancement
has been applied. (Filters: GOTham, KELvin,
LOMo, NAShville, TOAster. Crop 20% and 40%
represents the percent of the image cropped.)
These results are surprising, since they clearly show that
users’ natural behavior can serve to help protect them from
geo-privacy leaks, without requiring them to adopt new, yet-
unknown technology or applications, or radical changes in
their current photo sharing practices. It is easier to protect
images against the basic nearest neighbor approach, with the
Nashville filter protecting 75% of all images that were orig-
inally correctly geo-located by BNN. However, even against
the more powerful PGM approach, many filters do impres-
sively well. These findings suggest that geo-distinctive in-
formation is being naturally removed from the photo, as the
user filters the photo to enhance its attractiveness. Exam-
ples of the protective effect of enhancements at work are
provided in Fig. 5.
Figure 5: Example images whose locations are pro-
tected after enhancement. First column is the orig-
inal image; second column is the ‘geo-propagator’
that allows the original image to be geo-located;
third column is the enhanced image; fourth column
is the nearest neighbor of the enhanced image under
PGM, which no longer propagates the correct coor-
dinates. From top to bottom, the enhancements are:
Toaster, Lomo, Kelvin, tilt-shift.
The interesting exceptions are the cases in which enhance-
ment serves to open images to risk. The negative values in
Table 3 are the cases in which an enhancement actually re-
veals the locations of more images than it cloaks. Kelvin
apparently promotes automatic GLE by exposing contours
of objects in images, and cropping helps to set the focus
on the main subject of the photo, which is apparently often
geo-distinctive. Examples in which enhancements allow the
location of a photo to be automatically predicted when the
location of the original was not are shown in Fig. 6. In the
top row, the original (left) is blurred by tilt-shift (middle)
making is similar to a correct ‘geo-propagator’, and less sim-
ilar to other images in the background collection containing
horizontal lines at the top. In the second row, the contrast
of the original (left) is enhanced by Kelvin (middle) making
it more similar to images of the correct bridge, and less to
other similar hanging bridges in the collection.
In order to understand these results in more detail, we dis-
play an additional table devoted exclusively to PGM. Here,
we report the results in terms of the percentages of photos
whose geo-location has been correctly predicted. Results are
shown at both 100m and 1km, and also broken down into
the “Toponym-tagged” and “Toponym-tagless” cases.
Two major insights can be gained from this table. First,
the ability of enhancements to geo-cloak photos is compara-
Figure 6: Example images whose locations were pro-
tected before enhancement. The first column is the
original image, which could not be geo-located; the
second is the enhanced image; and the third column
is the geo-propagator matched to the enhanced im-
age (but not the original). Enhancements are: Tilt-
shift (top row) and Kelvin (bottom row).
Filter CropNo
Filter GOT KEL LOM NAS TOA 20% 40%
Tilt
Shift
7.63 3.74 7.83 5.38 7.18 3.53 7.28 7.88 6.43
Overall
11.86 6.48 11.86 8.23 10.97 5.63 11.76 12.11 10.22
9.49 4.83 9.34 5.78 7.99 3.88 8.62 8.94 7.12Toponym-
tagged 12.1 7.83 12.82 10.28 11.95 7.36 13.45 14.16 11.08
4.45 1.89 5.26 4.72 5.80 2.96 4.99 6.06 5.26Toponym-
tagless 11.46 4.18 10.24 4.72 9.30 2.70 8.89 8.63 8.76
Table 4: Geo-location estimation results: Percent-
age of target images correctly geo-located by PGM-
SURF for the enhancements GOTham, KELvin,
LOMo, NAShville, TOAster, cropping and tilt-shift.
White and gray-scaled cells show results at 100m
and 1km, respectively.
ble at both the 100m as well as the 1km level, although
cloaking is slightly more effective at 100m. Second, en-
hancements help to geo-cloak both ‘toponym-tagged’ and
‘toponym-tagless’. However, interestingly only certain filters
are helpful for ‘toponym tagless’ photos. Lomo, Nashville
and 20% cropping actually make it easier for GLE to pre-
dict the location of “toponym tagless” photos. In particular,
we note that the bottom two rows of Fig. 1 contain cases in
which the original photo not only fails to have a “toponym
tag”, if fails to have any tag at all. At the same time, the
visual match between these photos involves very small areas
in their background. Apparently, filters act differently in
making these areas more salient. In any case, we interpret
this result as signal that there is an underlying difference be-
tween photos that are more or less likely to be intentionally
linked to their geo-locations by the photographer, which is
worthy of future study.
5.3 Collective image enhancement patterns
Our experiments so far have yielded the satisfying insight
that has determined that the use of image enhancement fil-
ters can lead to the substantial reduction of the ability of
a geo-estimation system to correctly predict the location of
an image. However, an obvious question to ask is whether
enhancements might lose their power to protect geo-privacy
as the number of enhanced images in the background col-
lection grows. Our final experiment takes a look at what
happens as background images are themselves enhanced. In
real life, there are two considerations that would impact how
filtered images would accumulate in the background collec-
tion: first, the number of images that is filtered overall, and
second, the number of images that are filtered with a given
type of filter. Here, we chose to focus on a scenario that
constitutes a ‘worse case’ for geo-cloaking. In particular, we
investigate the effects when the same enhancement is applied
to both the target image and also specifically to potential
‘geo-propagators’ in the background collection. We perform
this experiment using the BNN-SIFT system. The top-100
visual nearest neighbors of the original target photo are re-
trieved. Then both the target photo and the top-100 list are
cloaked with a the same filter. The enhanced top-100 images
are then introduced into the background as replacement for
the original background collection images. We then carry
out GLE as usual.
Tab. 5 reports the percentages of enhanced target photos
that were retrieved when their nearest neighbors were also
enhanced.
GOT KEL LOM NAS TOA
Original
Back. Collect.
100m 1.51 3.08 2.15 2.88 1.41
1km 4.48 8.14 5.3 7.21 3.91
Filtered
Back. Collect.
100m 1.33 2.8 1.96 2.53 1.22
1km 4.08 7.56 4.76 6.21 3.56
Table 5: Comparison of percentage of enhanced tar-
get images whose location is correctly predicted us-
ing the original collection, and using a collection in
which the same enhancement has been applied to
the visual nearest neighbors.
Overall, the results of this experiment point to the conclu-
sion that a growth in the use of filters will not reduce their
ability to geo-cloak users’ photos. In fact, enhancing the
collection slightly reduces the ability of the GLE approach
to correctly predict the location of images. With these re-
sults we are apparently observing that filters introduce a
loss of that sort of information that is important in order
for automatic GLE approaches to function optimally.
6. VISUAL GEO-PRIVACY CHALLENGES
We have argued in this paper that the current state of
geo-location estimation technology warrants concern about
geo-privacy of users who take photos and share them on-
line. The conditions under which the location of a photo
can be automatically estimated depend both on the photo,
and on the contents of the data available to use as the back-
ground collection. Since these factors extend beyond what
a user can be expected to be aware of, it is impossible for
individual users to assess the risks to their own geo-privacy.
Instead, they need support from technologies developed by
visual information retrieval experts.
Our ultimate goal is to give users more control over geo-
privacy by supporting them in preventing unintended leaks
of geo-information while sharing photos online. Simple so-
lutions, such as ‘No-sharing’, fail because of the immediacy
of other concerns during the photosharing process. Even
if users share only privately, photos can fall into the wrong
hands. One part of the solution is obviously educating users,
and a growing number of efforts are under way to actually
teach users about social multimedia privacy [3]. However, an
important part of the solution involves technical challenges.
This paper has pointed out that although geo-privacy con-
cerns are growing, the situation is not hopeless. Rather there
are valuable insights that can be provided by research in the
area of visual information retrieval. We have shown that
users’ own photo taking and image enhancement behavior
actually has a contribution to make to protecting their pri-
vacy. We have systematically evaluated popular practices in
photo-taking and image enhancement, and shown their im-
pact on state-of-the-art geo-location estimation technology.
Although certain framing practices and Instagram filters are
effective in helping to protect privacy, there is no silver bul-
let solution. Instead, more work is needed to understand the
interactions of photo-taking behavior and enhancements.
In closing, we offer a concrete proposing for a research
goal. Moving forward GLE research should strive towards
the vision of the geo-privacy aware camera. Such a camera
would use visual information retrieval techniques to alert
users in real time when they take a picture that potentially
leaks their geo-location via its visual content. This device
is non-trivial, since it needs to access a enormous, and also
growing number of background images to estimate the vul-
nerability of a new image. However, the estimation times
achieved by our PGM approach are reasonably fast to be
useful to users. Using a Map-Reduce structure on a Hadoop
distributed server, our system achieves an average response
time of 1.8 seconds per target image. Research dedicated,
for example, to techniques that approximate the background
collection, could take a step nearer to fitting the collection in
memory, and thereby a step nearer to running a geo-privacy
aware camera from a mobile phone. We envision such an ap-
plication would also recommend to the user filters that add
Instagram style enhancements, but that are specially chosen
to protect geo-privacy. The key challenge of the geo-privacy
aware camera is that it should fit seamlessly into currently
widespread photographic practices, i.e., phototaking behav-
iors and the use of image enhancements.
Looking towards the future, it is critical that research fo-
cus not only on improving performance of automatic GLE,
but also on maintaining the correct balance between research
on technologies that predict the geo-location of social im-
ages, and technologies that protect geo-privacy.
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